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3. A theoretical-empirical analysis of restriction and concession 
Abstract. Similarly to its predecessor (Békési 2003), this paper is a study of two inter-
related types of contrast, restriction and concession. The theoretical part of my paper 
takes an example from E. Rudolph (Rudolph 1996, 393) as a starting point. By swapping 
the constituents making up the example, a paradigm with four components is established. 
This paradigm is then applied to an analysis of two further examples. The first simply 
serves to confirm the applicability of the paradigm to empirical studies. The second ex-
ample is used to draw more far-reaching conclusions. Here, contrast appears embedded 
in a causal structure (first, as a precedení, then as a succedent). The empirical analysis 
demonstrates that contrast, if embedded, can fünction only as concession, not as restric-
tion. 
3.1. A theoretical analysis of restriction and concession 
A comprehensive and systematic account of linguistic research into contrast (in what fol-
lows, mainly 'adversative' and 'concessive' relation) by Elisabeth Rudolph (Rudolph 
1996) differentiates between two or three basic methodological orientations. "... there 
are studies more inteiested in theoretical questions and others looking for application in 
natural languages. In re cent years one can observe a third group where theoretical results 
are discussed and confronted with examples of authentic language. 
The theoretical interest is concentrated on the attempt to find formai patterns that can 
be used for abstract descriptions of the meaning of complex sentences. Because of the 
complicated nature of adversative relations and the impossibility of describing them 
without taking the concessive relations into consideration there are no convincing pat-
terns of logical simplicity." (Rudolph 1996. 157) 
Although Rudolph has not provided a theoretically elaborate meaning structure, 
she presented a schema (an indication mark for the connection of contrast, p. 31., 
245., 316., 386), illustrated in Figure [I] and exemplified in (1). 
(1) But I began to learn the Thora, and my brother helped me, although he did not see 
why I, a girl, learned like a boy. [Elkezdtem a Thorát tanulni, és a bátyám nem értette, 




< 0 ^ 0 
The constituent maiked in [I/a] with a thin line represents the implicit proposition con-
tained in (1). This proposition corresponds to a conclusion - possibly formulated under 
the given circumstances: If someone in a situation characterized by the state of affairs 
described in (1) cannot understand how he could help, then he will not help. 
Schema [Il/a] and example (2) represent the concessive variant of (1). The proposi-
tion my brother did not see why occupies here a place following the aithough \bár\ 
which marks the main concessive relation. 
(2) I began to learn the Thora, and my brother helped me, aithough he did not see 
why I, a girl, learned like a boy. [Elkezdtem a Thorát tanulni, és a bátyám ebben segített 
nekem, bár nem értette, hogy én leányként miért tanultam úgy, mint egy fiú.] 
3.1.1 Swapping [I/a] and [H/a] 
There are two implicit propositions in (2): C and D. Here, too, proposition D represents a 
possible but not realized action in this utterance; proposition D is a conclusion implicit 
in B: it could not be expected that he would help. 
Note concerning schemata [I/a] and [H/bj 
If we consider proposition A as an antecedent, a cause, then proposition C is a con-
sequence, a reason; proposition B - as the second part of an adversative relation - is, 








Schema [II/b] is more than Schema [I/b] by proposition D. Here, proposition D is an an-
tecedent, a cause of proposition B. 
3.1.2 The order of the two constituents and the de [but] and bár [although] types of 
contrast yield the following four theoretical combinations. (Legend. p and q are two 
immediate constituents of the implication: if p, then q. 'pr' is used to denote pragmatic 
presupposition based on generál knowledge.) 
ad (1) [l/a] 
(Apr*) KNOWLEDGE generál 
If someone does not understand something, 
then he - usually - cannot be expected 
to provide help. 
ET 
(Ap) FACT unique 
My brother did not see why, 
I, a girl, Iearned like a boy. 
therefore* 
(Aq*) EXPECTATION unique (Bq) FACT unique 
(My brother) would not help he did help me. 
[II/b] 






ad (1) [Vb] 
(Ap*) KNOWLEDGE geneial 
If someone helps somebody 
in something, then he - generally -
can be thought of as understanding that 
ET 
(Ap) F ACT unique 
My brother helped me, 
therefore* 
(Aq*) PRESUMPTION unique 
(My brother) understands why I 
I leamed like a boy. 
(Bq) F ACT unique 
but did not see why 
I learned like a boy. 
ad (2) [H/a] 
(Bpr*) KNOWLEDGE general 
When someone doés not understand some-
thing then he is - usually not expected to help. 
ET 
(Bp) FACT unique 
although (my brother) did not see why ... 
therefore* 
(Bpr*) KNOWLEDGE general 
When someone helps another one in some-
thing then it can be presumed - usually - that 
he understands it. 
ET 
(Bp) FACT unique 
although (my brother) helped me, 
therefore* 
(Aq) FACT unique 
My brother helped me 
(Bq*) EXPECTATION unique 
(my brother) will not help. 
ad (2) [Il/b] 
(Aq) FACT unique 
My brother did not 
understand why I learned 
like a boy. 
(Bq*) PRESUMPTION unique 
(my brother) understands nevertheless 
why I learn 
like a boy. 
296 
3.2 An empirical analysis of restriction and concession 
The idea of theoretical arrangement presented under the above section can be further 
elaborated on the basis of an excerpt from Attila József. 
(3) "...akadt 
nő, ki érti e szavakat, 
de mégis ellökött magától. " 
(József Attila: Nagyon fáj) 
(3) íí... a woman 
has been found who understands these words 
but rejected me nevertheless." 
(Attila József: It hurts so much) 
3.2.1 Theoretical arrangement 
The arrangement possibilities related to the two phrases in bold are identical to those of 
(1) and (2). 
[I/a] who understands these words but rejected me nevertheless 
[I/b] who rejected me but understands these words nevertheless 
[H/a] who understands these words although she rejected me 
[H/b] who rejected me although she understands these words 
3.2.2 Variants that can and variants that cannot be integrated in the line of thought of the 
poem 
3.2.2.1 Only two, [I/a] and [Il/a], of the four theoretical variants can be embedded in the 
line of thought of the poem: the one with the originál arrangement and its concessive va-
riant. This comes as no surprise since they share one and the same 'pragmatic presuppo-
sitiori: 
'If I find a woman who understands these words, then she will not reject me.' 
[I/a] 
(Ap) FACT unique 
a woman has been found 
who understands these words 
(Aq*) HOPE unique (Bq) FACT unique 




(Bp). PRESUMPTION unique. 
although she understands 
these words 
since/therefore* 
(Aq) FACT unique (Bq*) EXPECTATION unique 
rejected me she should not have rejected me 
3.2.3 Empirical analysis 
Variants under [I/b] and [Il/b] cannot be embedded in the line of thought of the poem. 
The reason for this lies in the fact that they have different 'pragmatic presuppositions': 
'If a woman understands these words yet she rejects me, then either she does not un-
derstand these words anyway, or her relation to me does not depend on whether she un-
derstands those words, or not.' 
[Vb] 
(Ap) FACT unique 
who rejected me, 
(Aq*) PRESUMPTION unique 
does not understand these 
words 
(Bq) CANCELLATION OF 
EXPECTATION unique 
but she understands these 
words nevertheless 
[n/b] 
(Aq) FACT unique 
who understands these words, 
(Bp) FACT unique 
although she rejected me 
(Bq) EXPECTATION unique 
she was not expected to have 
been able to understand them 
On the basis of empirical analysis, the two theoretical schemata of Elizabeth Ru-
dolph used to express the essence of the cfe-[but]-type and the óár-[although]-type of 
interpretation can be simplified as follows. [The dotted line and the asterisk (*) indicate 
the implicit, linguistically not expressed character of the relation or component.] 
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(2.2) ((Aq) aithough (Bp)) 



































(1.2) ((Aq) aithough (Bp)) 





(Aq) EXPECT. CANCEL. unique ET 










he should If somebody then he 
not have does not do generally 






3.3.1 Theoretical description of the concessive and restrictive relations as notional struc-
tures 
(1.1) Josef K was arrested one morning but he hadn't done anything wrong. 
(2.2) Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong although he was arrested one morning. 
(1.2) Josef K was arrested one morning although he hadn't done anything wrong. 
(2.1) Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong but he was arrested one morning. 
The above four theoretical meaning structures can be presented in the diagrams below 
as follows: 
(1.1) ((Ap) but (Bq)) 
Josef K. was arrested one morning but he hadn't done anything wrong 
but 
thus* FACT upiqi 
(Bq) 
ue 
FACT unique since: * 
(Ap) PRESUMP. unique KNOWL. gen. 
(Aq*) (Apr*) 
Josef K was presumably he had 
arrested one done something 
morning wrong 
If someone is ar- Josef K. 
rested then he can - hadn't done 
in generál - be pre- anything 
sumed to have done wrong. 
something wrong. 
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í/e-[but]-type interpretation: ((Ap) de [but] (Bq)) 
((Ap) 
(Aq*) de (Bq) 
A bár-[although] -type interpretation: ((Aq) bár [although] (Bp)) 
bár -[although] (Bp) 
(Aq) (Bq*) 
3.2.4 In addition to the actual lesson learned from the above analyses, one can alsó for-
mulate a methodological conclusion. As we could see, the theoretical and the empirical 
methods of research are mutually dependent. In confirming the line of thought con-
tained in the excerpt from Attila József s poem, we resorted to a notional structure ar-
ranged in a paradigm. Lack of uniformity in the four-element paradigm (which mani-
fests itself in its division into two pairs) was revealed, on the other hand, with the help 
of the line of thought present in spoken text. 
3.3 Embedded contrast 
The first sentence of Franz Kafka's famous növel (Der Prozefi) goes like this: "Jemand 
mufite Josef K. verleumdet habén, denn ohne dafi er etwas Böses getan hatte, wurde er 
eines Morgens verhafiet." (Somebody must have accused Josef K., because although he 
hadrit done anything wrong, he was arrested one morning.) 
The main relation of the notional structure is represented by because. The proposi-
tion contained in the precedent is explained in the succedent. The role of explanation 
is fulfilled by a concessive structure. We can demonstrate this in two steps. 
As a first step, we eliminate the concessive structure and identify its place in the 
contrastive paradigm consisting of four components. Then we specify which (which 
two) of the four components allow for embedding in the precedent or succedent of the 
cause-and-reason relation. 
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(2.1) ((Ap) but (Bq)) 
Josef K. hadn't done anything wrong but they arrested him one morning. 
but 
thus* FACT unique 
FACT unique since* 






It did not 
even occur 
to him that 









then - in 
generál - he 
has no reason 
to think he 
might be 
arrested 




3.3.2 Theoretical description of the cause-and-effect relation as a notional structure 
thus* 









then either he has done Josef K. 
something wrong or was 
founded assumption') morning 
someone may have arrested 
accused him ('on 11— one 
Either Josef K. has 
done something 
wrong or someone 
may have accused him 
('on ill-founded 
assumption') 
3.3 Theoretical description of the novel-initial global sentence as a complex notional 
structure 
In the case below, component (2.1) of the contrastive paradigm is embedded in the 
because-relation (as its succedent). Then, the precedent of the contrastive structure plays 
a concessive role (because although). The precedent of the contrastive relation acquires 
a concessive function through repeating (thereby, admitting) the unique condition of the 
precedent: 
(Ap) Josef K. hasrit done anything (Bp) Although Josef K. hasn't 
wrong. done anything wrong. 
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then either he has 
done something 
wrong or he must 
have been accused 
of having done 
something wrong. 
Josef K. hasn't 
done anything 
wrong. 
Somebody must have 
accused Josef K. 
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he hadn't done anything wrong, he was arrested one morning. 
yet* 







( Bq*) (Cq) 
aithough he 
hadn't done 
anything wrong wrong 
CONDITION 
gen. 




then he must he should not have 
not be been arrested 
one morning he was 
arrested 
In figure (3.3.2), component (1.2) of the contrastive paradigm is embedded in the thus-
relation (as its precedent). 
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generál (Bpr*) unique (Bp) 
CONDITION IMPLICATION 
gen. gen. 
If someone has 
not done anything 
wrong 
then he must Josef K. hadrít 
not be done anything 
arrested wrong. 
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hadn't done anything wrong, therefore someone must have accused him. 
since* 














If someone then either he must Josef K. 
gets arrested have done 
something wrong 
or he must have 







One may ask on the basis of the ábove examples taken from pieces of literaiy art wheth-
er research into literature can exploit the results achieved though linguistic analysis of 
textual meaning. To the extent linguistic analysis can provide clear interpretations, the 
answer should be yes. Providing that the first clause of Kafka's sentence is in fact a 
'unique implicatum', the fnnction at hand cannot allow for somé "specific" conclusion 
(derived from its notional structure). Hence, instead of attaching no importance to 
whether Josef K. was accused or he nevertheless did commit something, we do not even 
ask such a question. The reader is made aware of the absurdity of the story of Josef K. 
through the very first sentence - the first notional structure of the first sentence - itself. 
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